What Happens If the Bab el-Mandeb Strait Closes?

Last updated: 2026-11-12

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a roughly 30-kilometer-wide channel between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, carried an estimated 5.4 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil and petroleum products in the first quarter of 2026, alongside 2.9 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of LNG, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). It is not currently closed, but Houthi attacks since November 2023 have repeatedly disrupted traffic, and roughly 60% of tankers were still taking the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope as of mid-2026 rather than risk the strait.

Where It Is

Bab el-Mandeb (“Gate of Tears”) sits between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti/Eritrea on the Horn of Africa, linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, beyond that, the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Together with the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline further north in Egypt, it forms the sea route connecting Persian Gulf oil and gas exporters to European and, in the other direction, some Asian markets. The EIA classifies it as one of six global oil transit chokepoints, alongside the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Bosphorus/Turkish Straits and the Panama Canal.

Energy Flows Through Bab el-Mandeb

The swing in the data tells the story: LNG shipments through the strait went to zero in the second quarter of 2025 as carriers avoided the route entirely, then partially recovered to 2.9 Bcf/d by the first quarter of 2026 as some operators judged the risk manageable again. Oil flows never stopped completely but fell well below the 2018 reference level during the worst of the disruption.

Major Exporters and Importers

Most of the oil and LNG that transits Bab el-Mandeb originates in Persian Gulf producers — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Iraq — and has already passed through the Strait of Hormuz further east. From Bab el-Mandeb, cargoes either continue north through the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline toward European refiners, or in some cases move onward toward other Atlantic-basin and Mediterranean markets. A smaller southbound flow moves the other way, connecting East African and Gulf supply toward Asian buyers. Because the same barrels typically clear both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb before reaching Europe, disruption at either chokepoint has knock-on effects on the other’s effective usefulness — a point discussed further below.

Alternative Routes

There is no pipeline bypass for Bab el-Mandeb equivalent to the Hormuz-area overland routes: it is a pure shipping chokepoint, so the only “alternative route” is the longer sea journey around Africa. Industry analysts estimate the Cape of Good Hope option only becomes cost-competitive with Suez/Bab el-Mandeb when bunker fuel prices are low (one cost model puts the breakeven around $70 per metric ton of fuel); at higher fuel prices, rerouting is a pure added cost accepted for safety reasons rather than an economic choice.

Historical Disruptions

1. November 2023: Yemen’s Houthi movement began attacking commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, initially in stated solidarity with Gaza during the Israel-Hamas war.
2. 2023–2024: repeated attacks pushed most container lines and many tankers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope; EIA data shows crude and petroleum-liquids transit through Bab el-Mandeb falling to about 4.1 mb/d in 2024, down from 6.2 mb/d in 2018. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has issued repeated advisories on Houthi attacks on commercial vessels through 2025 and into 2026.
3. May 2025: Houthi leaders agreed to a ceasefire with the United States, and attack frequency fell sharply; traffic recovered only partially, as underlying regional tensions remained unresolved.
4. Mid-2026: at least one Saudi-linked tanker, the Torm Innovation, made a Red Sea U-turn near Yanbu after Houthi threats and rerouted via Suez and the Cape of Good Hope; by mid-2026 an estimated 60% of tankers on the relevant routes were choosing the longer Cape of Good Hope passage.
5. July 2026: reporting citing regional security analysts flagged a risk that Iran could threaten to widen its Strait of Hormuz campaign to include Bab el-Mandeb, given Houthi alignment with Tehran, though no confirmed closure or mining of the strait itself has been reported.
6. September 24–25, 2026: the Saudi-led coalition intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the Red Sea port city of Yanbu; this was a strike on Saudi territory rather than on Bab el-Mandeb shipping directly, but it underscores that the wider Red Sea/Yemen conflict generating the strait’s risk premium remains active.
7. November 8, 2026: Houthi ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones aimed at Riyadh were intercepted by Saudi-led coalition air defenses, but falling shrapnel from one interception damaged an Aramco administrative tower in the capital’s King Abdullah Financial District; a separate ballistic missile aimed at the oil-producing Eastern Province was intercepted the same day. No casualties were reported and Saudi officials said the building was an administrative office rather than production or export infrastructure, but it was at least the fourth time in roughly five weeks that Houthi fire had reached Riyadh or an Aramco-linked site, underscoring that the conflict driving the strait’s risk premium had not de-escalated.

Why It Matters

What we know: Bab el-Mandeb is a pure maritime chokepoint with a known, currently reduced throughput and only one practical workaround — the much longer Cape of Good Hope route. Roughly 12–15% of world trade and about 30% of Asia–Europe container traffic normally uses the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb corridor, and Asia–Europe freight rates have run 25–40% above pre-crisis levels during the worst disruption, according to shipping-industry data.

Analyst scenarios (attributed, not TDE’s own forecast): Maritime-risk analysts at Kpler have noted that a simultaneous, severe disruption at both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb would be materially worse for global tanker markets than either chokepoint being disrupted alone, because cargoes that already detour around one obstacle lose the option of the other route entirely. This is a scenario flagged by named analysts, not a confirmed outcome.

What we don’t know: Whether the Houthi movement will resume large-scale attacks on shipping specifically (as opposed to strikes on Saudi and Israeli territory); whether any actor will attempt to physically mine or blockade the strait itself, which has not happened to date; and how quickly commercial shippers would return to the direct route if the security situation improved. Estimates of “world trade share” and freight-rate impacts also vary somewhat by source and time period, reflecting different survey methodologies rather than a single disputed fact.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait closed?
No. It remains open to shipping, but traffic has been repeatedly disrupted since November 2023, and a majority of tankers on relevant routes were still choosing the longer Cape of Good Hope detour as of mid-2026 rather than transit the strait directly.

How much oil passes through Bab el-Mandeb?
An estimated 5.4 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products transited the strait in the first quarter of 2026, alongside 2.9 billion cubic feet per day of LNG (EIA).

What happens if Bab el-Mandeb closes to shipping?
There is no pipeline alternative; ships would need to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, adding roughly 10–15 days and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fuel costs per voyage. Cargoes that also need to clear the Strait of Hormuz would face the compounded effect of both routes being constrained at once.

Is Bab el-Mandeb the same as the Suez Canal?
No, though they work together. Bab el-Mandeb is a natural strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa; the Suez Canal and the parallel SUMED pipeline are further north in Egypt. Persian Gulf cargoes bound for Europe typically transit both in sequence.

Why do Houthi attacks affect global oil markets?
The Houthi movement in Yemen controls territory overlooking the strait and has attacked commercial vessels there since November 2023, initially linked to the Israel-Gaza war. Even when attacks do not sink or seize a vessel, they raise insurance costs and prompt shipowners to choose longer, safer routes, which raises freight costs and can affect regional fuel prices.

Related The Daily Energy Pages

• What Happens When the Strait of Hormuz Closes?
• How Much Oil Passes Through the Turkish Straits?
• Why Are Oil Prices Rising?
• Why Are European Gas Prices Rising This Winter?
• What Is LNG? Liquefied Natural Gas Explained
• OPEC: Members, Quotas and Market Role
• Saudi Aramco Company Profile

Sources

• U.S. Energy Information Administration, “The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a strategic route for oil and natural gas shipments,” and World Oil Transit Chokepoints analysis (last updated March 3, 2026)
• U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), Maritime Security Communications with Industry advisories on Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, 2025–2026
• Kpler shipping and tanker-flow analysis, “Growing Houthi Risk Could Amplify Inefficiencies Across Tanker Trade Flows”
• S&P Global Commodity Insights, Red Sea shipping and tanker-rerouting reporting, 2025–2026
• Time, “Will Iran Target Another Maritime Chokepoint? The Bab El-Mandeb Strait Is Under Threat,” July 2026
• Al Jazeera / The National, reporting on intercepted Houthi missiles targeting Taif and Yanbu, September 24–25, 2026
• Reuters and CNN, reporting on the Houthi missile and drone attack that damaged an Aramco administrative tower in Riyadh’s King Abdullah Financial District, November 8, 2026

Illustrative image. Photo: Contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data [2021], processed by Pierre Markuse, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons — source